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INTRODUCTION 
The respondent, ISIF, has filed its response to the appellant's opening brief in the above 
captioned matter. As a result, the appellant/claimant is now filing his reply brief Following his 
review of the ISIF's response brief, the claimant is willing to point out the basic problems as 
contained in this response. The ISIF has attempted to avoid the basic errors of fact and law as 
contained in the findings of fact and order of the Industrial Commission by virtue of reframing 
the issues of this case and supporting this argument by suggesting an improper standard of 
review. Although the claimant would suggest that the Commission has committed gross error by 
virtue of ignoring its own findings of pre-existing shoulder impairment when it found that the 
claimant did not prove "the combined with" element of his case, the ISIF is attempting to 
persuade this COUli to deny this appeal and is suggesting that the claimant "has failed to 
demonstrate reversible error in the" decision of the Industrial Commission when it denied ISIF 
liability. This attempt at reframing of issues is confusing at best and misleading at the worst. It 
does not provide any meaningful discussion of the actual facts and law of this case and it does 
not discuss the appropriate standard of review. For the most part, the brief of the ISIF does not 
succeed in misleading any reasonable person willing to make a meaningful review of the law and 
facts of this case. 
ARGUMENT 
a. The ISIF has not Filed Any Cross Appeal in this Case. 
Although the ISIF has not appealed any findings of the Industrial Commission, it would 
appear that it may be attempting to persuade this Court to reverse the Commission's finding on 
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total permanent disability by virtue of its discussion of the facts and opinions of the vocational 
witnesses. The claimant would urge this court to refrain from any effort to consider the issue of 
total and permanent disability (or any other issue that may come up by virtue of the claimant's 
appeal) since the respondent is not cross-appealing any findings of the Industrial Commission 
and is not stating that it disagrees with any of the findings of the Commission herein. 
b. What Is the Appropriate Standard of Review? 
When attempting to focus on the issues that the ISIF may be attempting to support in its 
brief, it is clear that the ISIF is urging this Court to conclude that the standard of review for this 
case should be limited to an inquiry of whether the commission's findings are based on 
substantial and competent evidence. This attempt at changing the focus of review is not 
appropriate in any way in this case. 
The correct standard of review in this case is one of whether the Industrial Commission is 
correctly applying the facts and the law when interpreting any applicable work comp statute. 
Smith v. JB. Parson Co., 127 Idaho 937, 908 P.2d 1244 (1996). In other words, this Court must 
apply a much broader standard of review in this case since it is reviewing whether the 
Commission committed error when it misapplied the facts and the law when interpreting Idaho 
Code § 72-332. 
Regardless of the incorrect standard of review, the claimant will discuss other standards 
that may apply and attempt to distinguish the case law that may be applied by the ISIF herein. 
The Idaho Supreme Court exercises free review over questions of law, but reviews questions of 
fact only to determine whether substantial and competent evidence supports the Commission's 
findings. Stolle v. Bennett, 144 Idaho 44, 47-48, 156 P.3d 545, 548-49 (2007). The provisions 
of workers' compensation laws are to be liberally construed in favor of the claimant, as the 
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humane purposes they seek to serve leave no room for narrow, technical construction. Kinney v. 
Tupperware Co., 117 Idaho 765, 769, 792 P.2d 330,334 (1990). The Court must reverse the 
Commission if the findings of fact do not as a matter of law support the award or order. I.C. § 
72-732; Hamilton v. Ted Beamis Logging & Construction, 127 Idaho 221, 225, 899 P.2d 434, 
438 (1995). 
The interpretation of a statute is a question of law for the court. Gooding County v. 
Wybenga, 137 Idaho 20],46 P.3d 18 (2002). The statute must be construed as a whole, taking 
the literal words of the statute, which words must be given their plain, usual, and ordinary 
meaning. Thomson v. City of Lewiston, 137 Idaho 473,50 P.3d 488 (2002); State v. Hart, 135 
Idaho 827, 25 P .3d 850 (2001). If a statute is not ambiguous, the court does not construe it, but 
simply applies the ordinary meaning. Hansen v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 112 Idaho 663, 
735 P.2d 974 (1987). Unless the result is palpably absurd, or legislative intent is clearly to the 
contrary, a court must assume that the legislature means what is clearly stated in the statute. 
Aliller v. State, 110 Idaho 298, 715 P.2d 968 (1986); Garza v. State, 139 Idaho 533, 82 P.3d 445 
(2003). 
A statute is ambiguous where the language is capable of more than one reasonable 
construction. State v. Schwartz, 139 Idaho 360, 362, 79 P.3d 719, 721 (2003), citing Jen-Rath 
Co., Inc. v. Kit Mfg. Co., 137 Idaho 330,48 P.3d 659 (2002). The mere fact that parties present 
differing interpretations to the court does not mean, as a matter of law, that the statute is 
ambiguous. rd. If that were the law, all statutes would be considered ambiguous. Id. If the 
statute is ambiguous, then it must be construed to mean what the legislature intended for it to 
mean. ld. citing Miller v. State, 110 Idaho 298, 715 P.2d 968 (1986). To determine legislative 
intent, the court must examine not only the literal words of the statute, but also the 
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reasonableness of proposed constructions, the public policy behind the statute, and its legislative 
history. Id. citing Lopez v. State, Indus. Special In de n1. Fund, 136 Idaho 174,30 P.3d 952 (2001) 
and Adamson v. Blanchard, 133 Idaho 602, 990 P.2d 1213 (1999). 
It would appear that the ISIF is conceding that it has lost this appeal if the appropriate 
standard of review is applied here in this case. Therefore, the claimant will discuss this case as 
though this Court were applying the inappropriate standard of review as suggested by the ISIF. 
This Court's review with respect to questions of fact are limited to whether the Industrial 
Commission's findings are supported by substantial and competent testimony or 
documents. Substantial and competent evidence is relevant evidence that a reasonable mind 
might accept to support a conclusion. Stevens-McAtee v. Potlatch Corp., 145 Idaho 325, 179 
P.3d 288, 292 (2008). Substantial evidence is "something less than the weight of the evidence." 
The Court has indicated that "the substantial evidence rule requires a court to determine 'whether 
[the agency's] findings of fact are reasonable." Idaho State Insurance Fund v. Hunnicutt, 110 
Idaho 257, 715 P.2d 927 (1985). 
The Court has been reluctant to find error in the Commission's determination as to the 
weight and credibility of evidence unless the findings are clearly erroneous. Lethrud v. State, 126 
Idaho 560, 563, 887 P.2d 1067, 1070 (1995); Reiher v. American Fine Foods, 126 Idaho 58, 61, 
878 P.2d 757, 760 (1994). 
Regardless of the well established case law that suggests a limited review of any findings 
that may be generated by the Industrial Commission, this Court has generally indicated that 
Idaho's workers' compensation statutes should be liberally construed in favor of the employee. 
The exception is when there is substantial evidence in the record that is conflicting. Haldiman v. 
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American Fine Foods, 117 Idaho 955, 793 P.2d 187 (1990); Aldrich v. Lamb-Weston, Inc., 122 
Idaho 361,834 P.2d. 878 (1992). 
When applying the above inappropriate standard of review, it is clear that the 
Commission has committed significant error that must be reversed on appeaL Mr. Hope has 
presented evidence that he had a pre-existing shoulder impairment prior to being hired by Blazer 
Construction in the approximate year of 2002. The Industrial Commission has found that the 
pre-existing impairment for the shoulder (prior to the year 2002) was in the amount of 3% by 
virtue of the medical testimony of Dr. Robert Ward. The Industrial Commission has also found 
that Mr. Hope's shoulder impairment for his last injury in December of2003 was in the amount 
of 5%. The Claimant has proven a total "combined with" shoulder impairment of 8%. 
The Commission has also found that Mr. Hope's shoulder injuries (regardless of 
significant low back impairments) resulted in total and permanent disability. Somehow, the ISIF 
is suggesting that the Industrial Commission has not committed any gross error when it somehow 
implies that there is no pre-existing shoulder impairment to combine with the 2003 shoulder-
injury impairment to render the claimant totally and permanently disabled. The claimant is left 
to conclude that the ISIF is totally ignoring the Commission's finding that there was pre-existing 
shoulder impairment in the amount of 3%. Apportionment, according to the Carey doctrine, 
would result in a determination of 37.5% liability on the part of the ISIF. Clearly the ISIF has 
failed to show that it should prevail in this appeal regardless of the application of the wrong 
standard of review. 
The claimant believes that the ISIF has shown good effort in attempting to persuade this 
Court to use the wrong standard of review. When examining the use of this tactic it would seem 
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that the claimant's argument for gross error would be supported by this Court in the event it uses 
the correct standard of review, 
No matter what standard of review that may be applied in this case, it would seem that 
the ISIF and the Commission have joined in an effort to create new case law or to persuade this 
Court to apply the wrong standard of review in an effort to avoid attorney fees. Although it may 
be possible to persuade an appellate judge to misapply the law by virtue of applying the wrong 
standard of review, it is even more difficult to argue a misapplication of law when the standard is 
much more broad. Smith v, JB. Parson Co., Supra. Regardless of attorney fees or the wrong 
standard of review, Mr. Hope should prevail in his appeal of this case. 
c. The IS IF Attempts to Discuss Case Law that Does Not Apply in This Case. 
The ISIF brief contains many gross errors of fact and poor analysis of law in addition to 
the proposed misapplication of the standard of review. One such gross misapplication and 
analysis of fact is contained in the following conclusion of the ISIF: "[a]s the Commission 
noted, there was no evidence to suggest that Hope's preexisting right shoulder condition made 
any difference at alL" (Respondent's Brief - p. 12). Regardless of what the Commission and the 
ISIF may think, the Commission also quoted a statement of Dr. Ward that would warrant some 
discussion: 
[i]t must be noted with this last injury and surgery[,] Mr. Hope has significant 
disability. To put it bluntly[,] his shoulder is pretty well trashed! I doubt further 
surgery would help and I would be very surprised if any of the orthopedic 
surgeons would be inclined to use surgical intervention. He will have permanent 
lifting, reaching[,] pushing[,] pulling and carrying restrictions ... (Claimant's 
Exhibits - Bate No. 328; partially quoted by Commission in Findings at page 31 
Paragraph 81). 
It would seem that the ISIF and the Commission are attempting to create a new version of 
case law that misstates the evidence and further suggests that such misstatements should be 
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supported on appeal by virtue of some technical (or creative) definition as provided by the 
Commission and the ISrF in this case. 
Although the ISIF and the Commission can both misstate the evidence when applying 
any standard of review that they may choose, it is much easier to argue that the claimant has 
failed to prove his case when using the vvTong standard of review. Regardless, of the standard of 
review, it is quite clear that Dr. Ward was talking about all of the claimant's shoulder problems, 
including pre-existing problems, when he stated that the shoulder was "pretty well trashed." The 
argument of the ISIF (and the Commission finding) that there was no "combined with evidence" 
must totally ignore the above medical statement that was substantially quoted by the 
Commission in its findings. It would seem that the Commission and the ISIF are ignoring 
significant medical evidence that they suggest should be in the record in an effort to deny 
benefits in this case regardless of the appropriate standard of review. Such an overt effort to rely 
on a technical definition would seem to fly in the face of the general work comp rule as 
suggested in Haldiman and Aldrich, supra. 
To be fair with the defendant/appellant in this case, it would seem that there may be 
recent decisions of the Commission that may confuse and obscure interpretations of Idaho Code 
§ 72-332. Although there may be some confusion as to how a trier of fact should interpret the 
"combined with" test, the decision of the Commission in this case is very confusing and 
convoluted. Regardless of any confusion, it would seem to be well established in case law that 
the Commission should be able to find that a claimant has proven the combined with element 
rather than add an addition evidentiary rule or ignore medical testimony as it has in this case in 
relying on some technical and creative interpretation of case law. Such a conclusion in this case 
would support a wholesale revamp of case law and further confusion. If the Commission and the 
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ISIF are continually allowed to redefine what is and what isn't liability under § 72-332, support 
of such findings would likely discourage further filings under this code and limit the liability of 
the ISIF by virtue of some political scheme as employed by the ISIF and the Commission. 
CONCLUSION 
The ISIF has urged this Court to apply the wrong standard of review in this case. The 
Industrial Commission has ignored its own findings of pre-existing shoulder impairment in the 
amount of 3 % and a total "combined with" impairment of 8% when it quotes the medical opinion 
of Dr. Robert Ward and also agrees that the Claimant's shoulder is "pretty well trashed" as a 
result of pre-existing shoulder impairment that combines with additional impairment as a result 
of the Claimant's last accident in December of2003. The Industrial Commission has found that 
the Claimant is totally and permanently disabled and that such pre-existing impairment was a 
hindrance to employment. The previous decision of the Commission denying benefits and the 
decision denying the motion to reconsider as filed by the Claimant should be reversed and 
remanded. 
Dated this ~ay of August, 2013. 
ROBERT K. BECK & A 
//J~) 
Robert K Beck 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I't(,-
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the[lj day of August, 2013, I served the original or a 
true and correct copy of the following described document on the parties listed below, by 
mailing, postage prepaid, or by causing the same to be hand delivered as noted: 
DOCUMENT SERVED: 
Appellant's Reply Brief 
PARTIES SERVED: 
Anthony M. Valdez 
2216 Addison Ave. E 
Twin Falls, ID 83301-6744 




Robert K. Beck 
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